Privatization and the Providing of Public Facilities Through Private Means by Callies, David L. & Suarez, Adrienne
Privatization and the Providing of Public Facilities
through Private Means
By David L. Callies* and Adrienne . Suarez*
I. SCOPE AND INTRODUCTION
The providing of services and infrastructure/public facilities for local
government has long-since become too costly to be borne solely by local
government. As a result, many mechanisms have been devised to provide
alternate methods of financing such facilities.' The most obvious is simple
"privatization" of services and facilities, by directly shifting the primary
financial responsibility of providing such services to the private sector.
Other prominent techniques include impact fees, dedications and exactions
levied on private land development,2 and the levying of association dues by
homeowners associations in common-interest communities and
developments (CIC's and CID's). This article summarizes the law
associated with such techniques, together with legal issues involved in pure
privatization generally. This article concludes that the aforementioned
forms of privatization will, can, and should continue unabated considering
the shrinking availability of public funds, but notes some troubling issues
that such "privatization" raises.
II. FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE/PUBLIC FACILITIES THROUGH
SIMPLE PRIVATIZATION
A. Introduction
Simple privatization is defined as "any process aimed at shifting
functions and responsibilities, in whole or in part, from the government to
the private sector."3  Three forms of simple privatization include: (1)
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1 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, DAWN CLARK NETSCH, PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & JUDITH
WELCH WEGNER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 225-26, (5th ed. 2002);
DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND
USE 232 (4th ed. 2004).
2 See EXACTIONS, FEES AND DEDICATIONS (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995);
ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH (1999); DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL R.
CURTIN & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT (2003).
3 Donald G. Featherstun, D. Whitney Thornton II & J. Gregory Correnti, State and Local
Privatization: An Evolving Process, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 643, 646 (2001) (citing GAO REPORT
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contracting out, (2) asset transfer or government service shedding, and (3)
managed competition. Contracting out occurs when "a government entity
uses a private contractor instead of public resources to provide a
government service. 5 Asset transfer occurs when "a government entity
sells or leases a revenue-producing asset to a private sector entity that
undertakes to provide services to the public on a for-profit basis or
converts the asset to private use." 6 Government service shedding occurs
when "a government entity simply decides to stop providing a certain
service or function, leaving it to the private sector to fill the need if a
demand exists. ', 7 Finally, managed competition occurs when a government
entity "allows public as well as private sources to compete in providing the
service.'
8
B. A Survey of State Approaches to Privatization
The Hawai'i Supreme Court addressed the issue of privatization in
Konno v. County ofHawaii.9 In this case, the County of Hawai'i entered
into a contract with a private firm for the construction, operation, and
eventual closure of a landfill.'0 Civil servants traditionally staffed County
landfills." The United Public Workers ("UPW") sought damages,
injunctive relief, and a declaration that the contract contravened civil
service laws and was therefore void.' 2 The trial court granted a motion for
summary judgment in favor of the County, and the UPW appealed.13
In exploring the issue of privatization, the court examined how other
states have addressed the issue. It noted that there were three approaches
used to assess the constitutionality of privatization through contracting out:
(1) the "nature of the services" test14; (2) the "functional inquiry" test'5 ;
and (3) the "bad faith" test.' 6 Under the "nature of the services" test,
GAO/GGD-97-48, PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS LEARNED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENrS 1
(1997)).
4 See id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 647.
7 id.
a Id.
9 937 P.2d 397 (Haw. 1997).
'0 See id. at 400-01.
See id. at 401.
1, See id.
" See id. at 402.
14 Id. at 405.
" Id. The California courts call this test the "new state function test." Prof'l Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't
v. Def't of Transp., 13 Cal. App. 4th 585, 593 (1993).
Konno, 937 P.2d at 406.
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"services that have been 'customarily and historically provided by civil
servants' cannot be privatized, absent a showing that civil servants cannot
provide those services."' 17 Under the "functional inquiry" test, "[n]ew state
programs performing new functions are not constrained by civil service
laws."' 18 Under the "bad faith" test, "privatization violates civil service
laws only if the employer acts in 'bad faith' or with intent to circumvent
the civil service laws."'
' 9
In Konno, the court adopted the "nature of the services" test as the most
consistent with Hawai'i's existing civil service statutes.20  Moreover, the
court weighed the competing goals served by both civil service and
privatization, stating: "On the one hand, privatization purportedly can
improve the efficiency of public services. On the other hand, privatization
can interfere with the policies underlying the civil service as set forth by
the legislature, i.e., elimination of the spoils system and the encouragement
of openness, merit, and independence., 21 Because "the only unequivocal
support in [Hawai'i's] statutes is in favor of civil service policies," 22 the
court declined to "usurp the legislature's role by making [its] own policy
decision in favor of privatization. Thus, the court held that privatizing
the construction, operation, and eventual closure of a county landfill
violated the Hawai'i Constitution and civil service statutes.24 As the court
noted, it is useful to examine other states' approaches to privatization,
particularly how they've balanced competing public policies and applied
the "nature of the services," "functional inquiry," and "bad faith" tests in
cases involving the construction and maintenance of public infrastructure.
17 Id. at 405 (citing Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. Spokane Cmty. Coll., 585 P.2d 474, 477
(Wash. 1978) (discussed infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text)).
'a Id. (referring to Dep't. of Transp. v. Chavez, 7 Cal. App. 4th 407 (1992) (discussed infra notes
51-61 and accompanying text)).
'9 Id. at 406.
20 See id. at 408. Hawai*i's civil service laws are codified at chapter 76 of the Hawai'i Revised
Statutes. Hawaii's Constitution also contains a civil service provision. See HAW. CONST. art. XVI, §
I.
2 Konno, 937 P.2d at 410.
22 Id. at 411.
2 Id. Similarly, Colorado law on the civil service/privatization conflict does not reveal any
policy in favor of privatization. For that reason, the court in Colo. Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Dep't of
Highways, 809 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991) declined to permit the privatization of civil services. See also,
infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
24 See Konno, 937 P.2d at 412.
Journal of Law & Politics
1. A Necessary Initial Inquiry: Balancing the Competing Policies behind
Civil Service Protection versus Privatization
The Colorado Supreme Court balanced competing public policies in
Colorado Association of Public Employees v. Department of Highways25
before deciding that it would defer to its legislature for guidance on
privatization. In this case, the Colorado Department of Highways privately
contracted for highway custodial, maintenance, and utility workers.26 State
civil servants and their union and board of directors petitioned the
Colorado State Personnel Board for a declaratory order that the private
contracts violated Colorado constitutional and statutory provisions
protecting the state personnel system.27 The Board dismissed the civil
servants' petition.28 The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the private contracts were not authorized by state law.29
The court emphasized that such private contracts "so intimately
implicate the integrity of the constitutionally established state personnel
system that they cannot be entered into absent legislative or regulatory
criteria governing their propriety." 30 At the very least, the legislature and
regulatory bodies must balance the competing interests advanced by both
the state personnel system and privatization. The goals behind the state
personnel system include securing competent civil servants, curtailing
political patronage, and protecting civil servants' employment rights.
31
The primary goal behind privatization is cost savings.32 The court decided
that the civil service interests trumped the privatization interests in this
case, as there were no standards to guide the state's decisions to privatize
custodial, maintenance, and utility services. 3 Colorado has since adhered
to its decision to refuse to privatize services in the absence of legislative
and regulatory guidelines.34 Vermont has followed Colorado's lead.33
25 Colo. Ass 'n of Pub. Employees, 809 P.2d 988.
26 Id. at 990.
27 See id. (referring to COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13; COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50-128 (1988)).
20 See id. at 991.
9 See id.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 991-92.
32 See id.
31 See id. at 998.
3 See Horell v. Dep't of Admin., 861 P.2d 1194 (Colo. 1993) (refusing to permit privatization of
custodial and security services at state-owned buildings); Tising v. State Pers. Bd., 825 P.2d 1011
(Colo. 1991) (refusing to permit privatization of the University of Southern Colorado security service).
35 See Vt. State Employees Ass'n v.*Vt. Criminal Justice Training Council, 704 A.2d 769, 775
(VL 1997) (refusing to permit privatization of food services at police academy, because "definite and
specific standards setting forth conditions and requirements for privatization of state jobs are sorely
lacking in this state" and leaving the problem for legislative resolution).
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Alaska, on the other hand, has allowed privatization of a regional airport
under its constitution, after balancing pro- and anti-privatization interests.36
The balancing of these competing interests leaves to courts the important
decision of whether to rule on the issue of privatization themselves or defer
to the judgment of elected officials.
2. The "Nature of the Services" Test
Under the "nature of the services" test, services that have been
customarily and historically provided by civil servants cannot be
privatized, absent a showing that civil servants cannot provide those
services. The Washington Supreme Court applied the "nature of the
services" test in Washington Federation of State Employees v. Spokane
Community College.37  In this case, the Washington State Community
College District advertised its need for custodial services for a new
community college administration building and awarded a contract to a
private firm.38 The College justified its action by projecting cost savings of
more than $10,000 a year, which would be put towards student
instruction.39  The Washington Federation of State Employees sued to
declare the contract null and void and have its performance enjoined.4 °
The trial court issued an injunction, yet it later granted a motion for
summary judgment in favor of the College.4'
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed, holding that "as a matter
of law, the College has no authority to enter into a contract for new
services of a type which have regularly and historically been provided, and
could continue to be provided, by civil service staff employees. ,42 The
court reached its holding by choosing between the provisions of two
contradictory statutes: the first protecting the jobs of maintenance workers
at community colleges through the civil service merit system, and the
second permitting the state purchasing director to contract for college
maintenance services.43 Ultimately, the court adopted a "nature of the
services" 44 test, stating that services "customarily and historically"
45
36 See Moore v. State Dep't of Transp. and Public Facilities, 875 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1994).
37 See Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. Spokane Cmty. Coll., 585 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1978).
31 See id. at 476.
'9 See id.
40 See id.
4, See id.
42 Id.
43 See id. (referring to WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.16.010 (repealed 1993); WASH. REV. CODE §
43.19.190 (2005)).
44 See id. at 478.45 Id. at 477.
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performed by civil service workers shall not be privately contracted for,
absent a "showing that civil servants could not provide those services.,
46
Like Washington State, Louisiana has adopted the "nature of the services"
test.47 The test is also still valid in California,48 so long as the service
rendered is a traditional state function. A key exception to the "nature of
the services" test is impracticability. If there is a "showing that it is not
practicable for civil servants to provide the necessary services," then
privatization is permissible.49 The "nature of the services" test, therefore,
is the most protective of traditional civil service jobs. However, as
government finds it increasingly cumbersome and costly to continue
providing traditional services, civil service jobs may be displaced as
impracticable.
3. The "Functional Inquiry" Test
California has created, by statute, another exception to the "nature of
the services" test:50  the "functional inquiry" test, which permits
privatization of functions not traditionally fulfilled by civil servants. A
California appellate court applied the "functional inquiry" test in
Department of Transportation v. Chavez.51 In this case, the court examined
Cal. Govt. Code § 19130(b)(2), which allows private contracts where "the
contract is for a new state function and the Legislature has specifically
mandated or authorized the performance of the work by independent
contractors. 52 The California Department of Transportation ("Caltrans")
had contracted with private firms for the maintenance of roadside rest
areas.53 When the roadside rest areas were originally completed in 1963,
civil service workers alone maintained them.54 Throughout the next two
46 id.
47 See Jack A. Parker & Assoc., Inc. v. Louisiana, 454 So.2d 162, 167 (La. 1984) (holding that
privatization of actuarial services contravened state statute requiring that public service contracts
cannot displace jobs that "could and should be performed' by public employees").
48 See also State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Riley, 69 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1937); Burum v. State Comp. Ins.
Fund, 184 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1947).
49 Joint Crafts Council v. King County, 881 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1994) (allowing privatization of
maintenance and repair services for fleet of police vehicles); see also Burum, 184 P.2d 505.
5o See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19130; Cal. State Employees' Ass'n v. State, 199 Cal. App. 3d 840,
847 (1988) (holding that section 19130 is facially constitutional and does not conflict with California's
constitutional protection of the civil service system).
5' 7 Cal. App. 4th 407 (1992).
52 Id. at 409. Section 19130 was enacted in 1982 and provided a statutory exception to
California's traditional constitutional prohibition on contracting out civil service jobs. See id. at 414.
Case law before the enactment of section 19130 created the "nature of the services" test, which forbade
private contracts for jobs customarily and historically filled by civil servants. See id.
'3 See id. at 409.
4 See id. at 410.
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decades, Caltrans gradually turned over maintenance of rest areas to
private contractors until all of the rest areas were privately run.55 The civil
service employees who had previously maintained the rest areas were
absorbed into highway crews. 56 When Caltrans, finding an increased need
for rest area maintenance crews, entered into more private contracts, the
California State Employees Association objected.5 7 Ultimately the State
Personnel Board declared the contracts void.
58
In reviewing the Board's decision under section 19130, a California
appeals court stated that it was undisputed that the Legislature had
authorized the private contracts; the primary question was whether rest
area maintenance was a "new state function."59 The court held that, for
purposes of section 19130, "the contract must be for a new state function at
the time the [private] contract is executed., 60  Thus, the private
contracts at issue in this case were void, because they covered maintenance
jobs which were already in existence for two decades and therefore could
no longer be considered part of a new state function.
6
'
California has applied its "functional inquiry" test in other contexts to
allow privatization, such as the privatization of administrative services
under the state's Medicaid program 62 and an experimental program for
funding the construction and operation of tollway facilities. 63 So long as
the legislature continues to experiment with and expressly authorize new
ways to deliver traditional services, privatization will continue to displace
civil service workers.
4. The "Bad Faith" Test
Under the "bad faith" test, privatization violates civil service laws only
if the government acts in bad faith, with the intent to circumvent the civil
service laws. A Michigan appellate court applied the "bad faith" test in
55 See id.
56 Chavez, 7 Cal. App. 4th 407, 410-11.
"' See id.
51 See id.
59 Id. at 414.
60 Id. at 416.
61 See id.
62 See Cal. State Employees' Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 399 (1970) ("[T]he state
civil service suffers no displacement and the underlying constitutional policy is not offended when a
new state activity is conducted by contract with a separate public or private entity").
63 See Prof'l Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't v. Dept. of Transp., 13 Cal. App. 4th 585, 593-94 (1993)
(holding that, even though the design and construction of roads are traditional state functions, the novel
way the state intended to fund and manage the project constituted a "new state function," and the
project was properly privatized).
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Michigan State Employees Association v. Civil Service Commission.64 In
this case, the Michigan Civil Service Commission amended its Procedure
for Requesting Use of Contractual Personal Services to allow it to contract
out for services that "would be performed at substantial long-term savings
to the state. 65 Civil servants challenged the new amendment as facially
unconstitutional, in that it violated the civil service protections embodied
in the Michigan Constitution.66
The Michigan appellate court held that the amendment was
constitutional, in no way undermining civil service protection. 67 Absent a
showing of "bad faith or an attempt to reintroduce the 'spoils system,"' 68
the court found that contracting out civil service jobs, for reasons of
efficiency and economy, is permissible. 6
9
Other states permit good faith privatization of such areas as food
services 70 and custodial services71 at state colleges and data processing and
communication services for state government.72 The "bad faith" test
allows economic justification of privatization, while the "nature of the
services" test does not. In this way, review under the "bad faith" test is
more likely to permit privatization, as privatization necessarily results in
cost savings for the state.
So long as the provision of services continues to be too costly for
government to bear, privatization of many of the jobs that civil servants
perform will continue unabated. Some courts remain willing to usurp the
legislative role in approving privatization plans. Others have adopted the
more stringent "nature of the services" test, requiring a showing that civil
servants can no longer perform services that government seeks to
privatize. Increasingly, however, courts have struck a balance favoring
privatization over civil service protection. Privatization easily passes state
constitutional muster under lenient "bad faith," "functional inquiry," and
"impracticability" reviews. The advantage to liberal privatization rules is
that government is free to elicit private, innovative ways to efficiently
m 367 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
65 Id. at 851.
6 See id. (citing MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 5).
61 See id. at 852.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See Ball v. Bd. of Trustees, 248 A.2d 650, 653 (Md. 1968); Conn. State Employees Ass'n v.
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Conn., 345 A.2d 36, 39 (Conn. 1974); Univ. ofNev. v. State Employees
Ass'n, 520 P.2d 602, 606-07 (Nev. 1974).
71 See State ex rel. Sigall v. Aetna Cleaning Contractors, 345 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ohio 1976).
72 In re Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. O'Rourke, 660 N.Y.S.2d 929, 935-36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1997).
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provide public services. Liberal privatization rules necessarily benefit
governments struggling to provide as many services at as little expense as
possible. But in striking this utilitarian balance, governments should guard
against unintended consequences. Unchecked privatization could lead to
the loss of qualified employees, government's abdication of its traditional
role in meeting municipal needs, and perhaps the reintroduction of political
patronage and the spoils system. The privatized state may come to
resemble less of a social contract, the services under which are staffed by
meritorious citizens, and more of a patchwork of privately contracted
projects, staffed by private workers and sold to the lowest bidder. The
privatization of municipal services is but one tool of effective
government-one which should be used judiciously.
III. FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE/PUBLIC FACILITIES THROUGH IMPACT
FEES, DEDICATIONS AND EXACTIONS
As simple privatization has become widespread, so have other forms of
privatization, including the use of impact fees and dedications to fund
public facilities. Both types of exactions, or land development conditions,
are contractual in nature; in exchange for permission to develop, a
developer agrees to give the municipality money (an impact fee) or land (a
dedication) to provide for the public facilities or resources necessitated by
the new development. To the extent such exactions relieve local
governments of the obligation to pay for such facilities, they are
"privatized": the cost is borne by developer and purchaser.
The use of impact fees and dedications to pay for public facilities must
follow the rules laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in two landmark
decisions. First, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n 73 requires an
essential nexus between the exaction and the specific need driven by the
new development.74 Second, Dolan v. City of Tigard75 requires that the
exaction requested must also be roughly proportional to the impact upon
public facilities and resources directly attributable to the new
development.76 A land development condition that lacks an essential nexus
and is not roughly proportional to the need generated by the development
is a type of regulatory taking, prohibited by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.
" 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
14 See id. at 838-39.
71 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994).
76 See id. at 388.
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There is a growing trend to regard the Nollan and Dolan tests as
requiring "heightened scrutiny" of the constitutionality of exactions. In
California in particular, courts apply heightened scrutiny to exactions
imposed through the administrative or quasi-judicial, as opposed to general
legislative, process. There is also a growing sense that all land
development conditions, be they impact fees or dedications, are subject to
heightened scrutiny. As exactions have become a significant means of
acquiring and funding public infrastructure and resources, local
governments should become conversant with the constitutional
requirements involved in conditioning land development.
A. Unconstitutional Land Development Regulations as Takings: Nexus
and Proportionality Problem
Judges and commentators have long suggested that conditions,
exactions, and dedications attached to land development permits must bear
some proportionate relation to the land development upon which they are
levied." As the following analysis makes clear, such land development
conditions (impact, mitigation and "in-lieu" fees and other exactions, and
land dedication requirements) are development driven. This means that the
dedication or exaction is justified because the contemplated land
development project generates the need for the public facility or other
infrastructure improvement. It follows from this requirement that levying
or charging such exactions and dedications on the rezoning or boundary
amendment process is always inappropriate, because neither boundary
amendments nor zoning generates such needs. It also follows that the fee
collected or the interest in land acquired by government must be spent or
used - and soon - for the public facility or improvement for which it was
collected. Failure to spend or use the fee or land renders the basis for
charging it invalid. So does failure to use or spend it reasonably quickly,
or spending the collected fees for general or different purposes (i.e., a road
fee for school purposes).78 While all of these are salient legal issues, most
litigation over land development conditions arises because of questions
about the relationship of the condition on a land development permit to
77 See, e.g., Ira M. Heyman & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased
Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119,
1134 (1964).
78 See Webber Basin Home Builders Ass'n v. Roy City, 487 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah 1971).
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problems or needs generated by the contemplated development justifying
that condition.79
1. The Elements of Nexus and Proportionality
Together, the Supreme Court's holdings in Nollan and Dolan require
that in order to pass constitutional muster, land development conditions
imposed by government:
1. must seek to promote a legitimate state interest;
2. must be related to the land development project upon which they
are being levied by means of a rational or essential nexus;
3. must be proportional to the need or problem which the land
development project is expected to cause, and the project must accordingly
benefit from the condition imposed.
Under the first requirement, legitimate state interest, an agency may
only require a landowner to dedicate land (or interests in land) or
contribute money for public projects and purposes, such as public facilities
and, in most jurisdictions, public housing.
Under the second requirement, rational or essential nexus, an agency
must find a close connection between the need or problem generated by the
proposed development and the land or other exaction or fee required from
the landowner/developer. Thus, for example, a residential development
will in all probability generate a need for public schools and parks. A
shopping center or hotel in all probability will not. Both, however, will
generate additional traffic and therefore generate a need for more streets
and roads.
Under the third requirement, proportionality, a residential development
of a few hundred units may well generate a need for additional classroom
space, but almost certainly not a new school or school site. On the other
hand, such a residential development of several thousand units would,
when constructed, likely generate a need for a new school and school site,
depending upon the demographics of the new residents.
79 While the recently-decided U.S. Supreme Court case of Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 125 S. Ct.
2074 (2005), eliminated the "substantially advances a legitimate state interest" from Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 US 260 (1980), the Court nevertheless specifically noted that its decision left the Nollan-
Dolan and its related takings jurisprudence intact.
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2. The Nexus/Proportionality Tests Applied: Selected Examples
Many cases have struck down land development conditions for lack of
nexus and/or proportionality. In Homebuilders Ass 'n of Dayton v. City of
Beaver Creek,80 an Ohio Court of Appeals held Dolan inapplicable because
the impact ordinance in this case was legislatively imposed rather than
"adjudicative," but nonetheless applied a proportionality and nexus
standard to invalidate a road impact fee for:
a. insufficient "quantification";
b. unreasonable traffic projections;
c. arbitrary and capricious application because "buildout," or full
development, was too far away and there were too many exceptions;
d. failure to segregate administrative expenses or interest on the
funds;
e. intent to deposit fee collected in general fund.
Land development conditions must be exacted during the appropriate
stage of development in order to meet the above test. For example, a
requirement that a developer construct school facilities at the boundary
amendment stage would not meet the above tests because any
contemplated build-out is years away, and there is no attempt whatsoever
at quantification. Many cases undertake such an analysis.8 ' There are also
80 Nos. 97-CA-1 13, 97-CA-1 15, 1998 WL 735931 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998).
a' See Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 990 P.2d 429 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(striking down a 30% open space dedication requirement on a 51-lot subdivision approval, while
upholding a road dedication requirement for emergency vehicles in the absence of evidence concerning
the cost of the road and its effects on the subject property); Reynolds v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, No.
309721, 1996 WL 383363 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1996) (striking down a requirement that the
landowner grant a conservation easement over three of his lots as a condition of developing a fourth lot,
in part on the ground that such a condition would not pass a "nexus" test); Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of
Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 391 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (striking down a road widening dedication,
holding that the taking of 20% of Amoco's land for roadway widening purposes on the basis of a .4%
increase in traffic caused by the proposed development "does not correspond with the slightest notions
of rough proportionality"); Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (striking
down a road-widening dedication); Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, No. 272170,
1992 WL 239100 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 1992) (striking down a road improvement dedication);
Property Group, Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 628 A.2d 1277 (Conn. 1993) (striking down
road widening dedication); Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1992) (striking down a bridge dedication requirement); Cobb v. Snohomish County, 829 P.2d
169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (striking down a road improvement fee); Dellinger v. City of Charlotte, 441
S.E.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (striking down a road dedication requirement); Castle Homes & Dev.
v. City of Brier, 882 P.2d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (striking down a per-lot road impact fee);
McClure v. City of Springfield, 28 P.3d 1222 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating a sidewalk and "clipped
corner" exaction in the absence of specific findings explaining how these exactions were relevant or
proportional to the city's interest in safe streets at the location of the proposed development); St. Johns
County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (holding that a fee of $448 per
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literally dozens of additional pre-Nollan/Dolan cases upholding various
impact fees and exactions for roads, sewers, water, and housing where at
least the nexus standard later imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court appears
to have been met.
82
3. Applicability of Nexus/Proportionality Test Beyond Dedications
Since both Nollan and Dolan involve impermissible land dedications,
some commentators (and a few courts) have limited the three-part test
above to land dedication conditions.8 3 However, the California Supreme
Court, in, Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,84 when the case was remanded by
the U.S. Supreme Court to be decided in light of Dolan, applied the nexus
and proportionality test to a mitigation fee and held it unconstitutional,
specifically rejecting the argument that heightened scrutiny applied only to
dedications as in Nollan and Dolan. To the same effect is Manocherian v.
Lenox Hill Hospital,85 in which the New York Court of Appeals struck
down a rent-stabilization statute. Citing both Nollan and Dolan, the court
reasoned:
[T]he Supreme Court refrained from placing any
limitations or distinctions or classifications on the
application of the 'essential nexus' test. This suggests and
supports a uniform, clear and reasonably definitive
standard of review in takings cases. Indeed, Justice
Brennan, in dissent in Nollan expressly attributed to the
single-family dwelling met the rational nexus test when applied to a 100-unit subdivision, but failed a
proportionality standard because it was not clear that the money collected would necessarily benefit
those who paid the fee); Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach LLP, 760 So. 2d 126 (Fla.
2000) (holding that a school impact fee as applied to a retirement community failed the rational nexus
test because the community was subject to covenants prohibiting minors from residing there); Everett
Sch. Dist. No. 2. v. Mastro, No. 42835-7-I, 1999 WL 674782 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1999)
(upholding a school impact mitigation fee based on the average number of students in 869 apartments
in 25 buildings as a condition for the issuing of a building permit for an apartment complex, because
the fee calculation provided for no impact from studio apartments and was based on the exact number
of one and two bedroom apartments in the complex); Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996) (striking down a school facilities requirement as a rezoning condition).
82 See City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000 (Md. 2000). Although the decision itself is
badly flawed and demonstrates a misunderstanding of takings and exaction law, it sets forth a
comprehensive list of cases upholding various exactions.
See Bamber v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 162 (1999) (holding that neither case was applicable
beyond property dedication situations); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., I P.3d 178 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1999); Montclair Parkowners Ass'n v. City of Montclair, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999).
84 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
" 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994).
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majority's holding an impact on all regulatory takings
cases.
86
The trend toward applying such "heightened scrutiny" to monetary
exactions as well as dedications appears to be growing. Not surprisingly,
following the state supreme court's holding in Ehrlich, California courts
are uniformly applying such scrutiny to monetary exactions.87
B. The Legislative/Administrative Distinction in Imposing Exactions
Another distinction that an increasing number of courts have made is
characterizing the nexus/proportionality standards as a form of "heightened
scrutiny," only applicable to administrative or quasi-judicial, as opposed to
legislatively-imposed, land development conditions. The Ehrlich case,
discussed in the preceding subsection, clearly makes that distinction,
striking down a mitigation fee in part because it was "ad hoc" rather than
s6 Id. at 483. See also Clark v. City of Albany, 904 P.2d 185, 189 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he
fact that Dolan itself involved conditions that required a dedication of property interests does not mean
that it applies only to conditions of that kind").
s7 See, e.g., Valley Children's Hosp. v. County of Madera, No. E037474, 2002 WL 31484784(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2002); Abrams v. City of San Diego, No. D038402, 2002 WL 31421287 (Cal.
Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002) (applying the standard to a special assessment); Agencia La Esperanza Corp. v.
Orange County Bd. of Supervisors, No. G027288, 2002 WL 681798, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. April 24,
2002) ("As noted by our Supreme Court in Ehrlich, California law draws no distinction between the
physical taking and the imposition of fees."); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 49 P.3d
860, 864 (Wash. 2002) (footnote omitted):
[We] emphasize the similarity of exacting land and money. If the government in
Nollan and Dolan had exacted money rather than land and then purchased land
to solve the problems, the same questions would arise: was the money exacted
for and used to solve a problem connected to the proposed development?
(Nollan.) And was the amount of money exacted roughly proportional to the
development's impact on the problem? (Dolan.) Surely if the issues for an
exaction of money are the same as for an exaction of land, the test must be the
same: a showing of "nexus" and "proportionality."
See also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, 71 S.W.3d 18, 32 (Tex. App. 2002):
The fact that the Supreme Court has not yet applied the Dolan test to a
development exaction of fees or public improvements, as opposed to a
dedication of land, does not mean that the Dolan test does not apply.
Accordingly, we decline to globally limit the application of the Dolan test to
only dedicatory exactions in the manner the Town urges based on the quoted
statement from the Del Monte Dunes opinion.
See also Rogers Machinery, Inc. v. Wash. County, 45 P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). In Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court simply observed that it had never applied
heightened scrutiny beyond dedications, and declined to apply it to a simple land reclassification or
rezoning, which, of course, surprised no one.
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part of a uniformly-imposed legislative exaction. It is therefore not
surprising that a number of recent California decisions make the same
88distinction.
Legislative deference notwithstanding, it is not easy to see the basis for
such a distinction. As Justice Thomas observed in his dissent to a denial of
a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in Parking Ass 'n of
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta:8
9
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on
the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking.
A city council can take property just as well as a planning
commission can. Moreover, the general applicability of
the ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis..
. . The distinction between sweeping legislative takings
and particularized administrative takings appears to be a
distinction without a constitutional difference. 90
C. Categories and Timeliness of Imposing Fees as Land Development
Conditions
Finally, it is worth noting that any impact fee or in-lieu fee collected for
a particular kind of public facility must not only be used for that category
of facilities alone (road fees for roads, water fees for water, and so forth),
but must also be used in the area serving the proposed development, and
within a reasonable length of time. This logically follows from the core
88 See Extra Space of Laguna Hills v. San Joaquin Hills Transp. Corridor Agency, No. G028469,
2002 WL 683825, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. April 24, 2002)("Here, the calculation of development fees,
imprecise as it may be, is applied uniformly, generally and ministerially. As a result, heightened
scrutiny is not triggered"); San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal
2002) ("We decline plaintiff's invitation to extend heightened takings scrutiny to all development fees,
adhering instead to the distinction we drew in Ehrlich between ad hoc exactions and legislatively-
mandated, formulaic mitigation fees"); Agencia La Esperanza Corp. v. Orange County Bd. of
Supervisors, No. G027288, 2002 WL 681798, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. April 24, 2002) (citing Ehrlich);
Home Builders Ass'n. of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(upholding a water resource development fee as a condition on the issuance of a building permit, on the
ground that the fee involved a legislative, rather than an adjudicative, determination, and the Krupp
case discussed in the immediately preceding section); Homebuilders Ass'n of Metropolitan Portland v.
Tualatin Hills Park and Recreation Dist., 62 P.3d 404, 409 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he [fee] is 'a
generally applicable development fee imposed on a broad range of specific, legislatively determined
subcategories of property through a scheme that leaves no meaningful discretion either in the
imposition or in the calculation of the fee" and so heightened scrutiny is not warranted); Rogers
Machinery, Inc. v. Wash. County, 45 P.3d 966, 983 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) ("[W]e are persuaded by the
reasoning of other state courts, representing a nearly unanimous view, that Dolan's heightened scrutiny
test does not extend to development fees of that [legislative] kind.").
89 515 U.S. 1116 (1995).
90 Id. at 1117-1 118.
Journal of Law & Politics
requirement that fees and dedications be development-driven in order to be
legally levied. Obviously the legal connection disappears if the fees are
used for some other purpose, or in some other neighborhood, or are held
for a substantial amount of time without use. 9'
In sum, the privatization of public facilities through impact fees,
exactions, and dedications can raise serious constitutional questions
concerning nexus and proportionality. One solution is to seek such
contributions and dedications for facilities through the development
agreement. Several states have adopted this solution by statute, and county
and municipal governments in California have executed literally hundreds
of these development agreements. Most courts appear to accept such
agreements as long as they are part of a consistent legislative scheme
despite claims by opponents that such agreements amount to illegal
contract zoning.92
IV. COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITIES AND THE LEVYING OF
ASSESSMENTS FOR FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE/PUBLIC FACILITIES
Common-interest communities (CICs) are also prominent participants
in the privatization of infrastructure. Private CICs fund, provide, and
maintain private infrastructure, such as roads and parks for the
community's benefit, by levying assessments from their members. The
power to assess is implied, based on the theory of quasi-contract or on the
analogy of CIC as mini-government. With these assessments, CICs are
able to provide the same, if not better, infrastructure and services than the
surrounding municipality. In addition to privately provided infrastructure
and services, CICs promise privacy, exclusivity, and the perception of
safety. Those who can afford to wall themselves off from the rest of
society can do so.
CICs tend to tempt the wealthy out of the cities, "siphoning off their tax
dollars, their expertise and participation, and their sense of identification
91 See, e.g., Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Weber Basin Home Builders Ass'n v. Roy City, 487 P.2d 866 (Utah 1971);
Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982); State ex rel. Waterbury Dev. Co. v. Witten, 377
N.E.2d 505 (Ohio 1978).
92 See, e.g., Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County Bd. of
Supervisors, 84 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). See generally CALLIES ET AL., supra note
2, at 91-115.
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with a community," in essence creating a "secession of the successful." 93
With enough of these communities, the surrounding cities and counties
could find themselves bereft of much of their population and resources, so
that "the city could become financially untenable for the many and socially
unnecessary for the few." 94  Critics observe that by living in a gated
community, residents are not supporting the public services that support
the community at large. 95
In response to some of these perceived problems, some cities have
elected to pass ordinances banning such communities. Cary and Carrboro,
North Carolina, passed their ordinances because citizens expressed concern
that gated communities within their city boundaries could delay the
response times of emergency vehicles. 96  One alderman explained the
dislike for walls and gates by saying: "We're a community of
interconnected neighborhoods. Walls are unfriendly.,
97
Homeowners in a community development still must pay local property
taxes for local government services, whether or not they avail themselves
of such services, and even though they already pay extra for their private
community's services. 98  As a group, therefore, they are an easily
mobilized voting bloc that will vote to protect property values, lower
property taxes, and seek tax equity.99 Considering that more than thirty
million Americans live in private communities, 00 with eight million in
gated communities, 1 1 these individuals can form a very large, local voting
bloc.
Thus, members of homeowner associations have begun requesting tax
deductions for their dues. They pay for their own public services and see
no need to pay for others' as well, especially if they do not partake of those
services elsewhere, such as garbage collection, street maintenance,
security, and recreation.10 2 However, people living in private communities
93 EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 23 (1994) (citing Robert Reich, Secession of the Successful, NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE, Jan. 20, 1991, at 42).
94Id. at 186.
95 See Lois M. Baron, The Great Gate Debate, 21 Builder 92 (Mar. 1998).
96 Alan Scher Zagier, 'Gated' Living Inspires Debate, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER, June 7, 1998,
at Al, available at 1998 WL 6141834.
97 Id.
98 MCKENZIE, supra note 93, at 188.
99 Id. at 192-93.
1oo See Andrew Stark, America, the Gated?, 22 WILSON Q. 58 (1998), available at 1998 WLNR
5190555.
lo See Richard Damstra, Don 't Fence Us Out: The Municipal Power to Ban Gated Communities
and the Federal Takings Clause, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 525, 529 (2001).
102 See Stark, supra note 100.
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do use some public services and it would be difficult to determine exact
percentages of what each homeowner uses.
In California, the reverse is also true, in that the public uses privately
provided infrastructure and services. Where Proposition 13 effectively
limited the amount of public services provided by local government, those
who sought certain amenities felt compelled to provide their own.
10 3
Private developments began including their own streets, drainage, parks,
recreation facilities, and streetlights. 10 4 Where the communities are not
gated, the general public has access to these privately funded
infrastructures, for which the public paid nothing. Meanwhile, the relevant
municipality still taxes private community homeowners to provide the
same infrastructures for the public as well. Obtaining a rebate for
providing their own segment of public services is a major political goal of
people living in planned communities. 0 5 The opposition argues that one
rarely pays taxes for only what one uses or receives.10 6 Further, they claim
that when a private community provides some of its own public services,
the municipality can withdraw from those areas in an effort to save money
and manpower, 0 7 thereby effectively lowering everyone's costs.
A. Common-Interest Communities Defined
Aside from state statutes, other general sources such as the Restatement
(Third) of Property (Servitudes) ("The Restatement") and the Uniform
Common Interest Ownership Act ("UCIOA") define "common-interest
community." According to the Restatement, a "common-interest
community" is:
a real-estate development or neighborhood in which
individually owned lots or units are burdened by a
servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot be
avoided by nonuse or withdrawal: (a) to pay for the use of,
or contribute to the maintenance of, property held or
enjoyed in common by the individual owners, or; (b) to
pay dues or assessments to an association that provides
services or facilities to the common property or to the
individually owned property, or that enforces other
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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servitudes burdening the property in the development or
neighborhood.1
0 8
Similarly, the UCIOA defines a CIC as "real estate with respect to
which a person, by virtue of his ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for
real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance, or improvement of
other real estate described in a declaration."'
0 9
The comments accompanying section 6.2 of the Restatement further
explain that a CIC is characterized by either commonly held property or a
community association, although most common-interest properties have
both. 0  Further, CICs are typically created by declaration."' The
declaration imposes the servitude that obligates the individual homeowners
to pay for common property usually through mandating membership in the
community association.12 A formal declaration that a community is a CIC
is not necessary." 3  Instead, a CIC may arise by implication." 4  If
homeowners are subject to a servitude that obligates them to pay for
common property, they impliedly constitute a CIC.' 5  Also, if a
declaration establishes a community association to manage common
property but neglects to provide means of funding such management, a
CIC is implied."
6
B. Community Associations' Power to Levy Assessments to Provide, Fund,
and Maintain Infrastructure
CICs collect assessments from their residents in order to provide, fund,
and maintain common infrastructure like roads, sewers, parks, and the like.
The Restatement states:
(1) Except as limited by statute or the declaration: (a) a
common-interest community has the power to raise the
funds reasonably necessary to carry out its functions by
levying assessments against the individually owned
property in the community and by charging fees for
lO RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000).
109 Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act § 1-103(7) (1994).
... See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. a (2000).
1 See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
11 See id.
116 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. a (2000).
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services or for the use of common property; (b)
assessments may be allocated among the individually
owned properties on any reasonable basis, and are secured
by a lien against the individually owned properties.'"
7
Similarly, the UCIOA lists the specific powers of community
associations. Below are selected powers that pertain to providing, funding,
and maintaining infrastructure:
(6) regulate the use, maintenance, repair, replacement, and
modification of common elements;" 8 (7) cause additional
improvements to be made as a part of the common
elements;" 9 (10) impose and receive any payments, fees,
or charges for the use, rental, or operation of the common
elements, other than limited common elements ... and for
services provided to unit owners;' 20 (11) impose charges
for late payment of assessments, and, after notice and an
opportunity to be heard, levy reasonable fines for
violations of the declaration, bylaws, rules, and regulations
of the association[.] 12'
In addition to powers granted to them through their declarations and by
statute, the Restatement would grant community associations those
"powers reasonably necessary to manage the common property, administer
the servitude regime, and carry out other functions set forth in the
declaration."'' 22  The effect of reading into the declaration "reasonably
necessary powers" is that community associations maintain wide-ranging
and tight control over their members' financial obligations to the CIC.
123
Similarly, the UCIOA allows community associations to "exercise any
other powers necessary or proper for the governance and operation of the
association." 124
"I' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.5 (2000).
118 Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act § 3-102(a)(6) (1994).
"9 Id. § 3-102(a)(7).
120 Id. § 3-102(a)(10).
12 Id. § 3-102(a)(11).
122 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.4 (2000).
12 Id. § 6.4, cmt. a ("[T]o the extent these powers are necessary for maintenance of common
property, limitations on the powers should be narrowly construed.").
124 Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act § 3-102(a)(17) (1994).
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Thus, the community association exercises great power in its ability to
assess funds for common infrastructure from its residents. Even if no such
fundraising power exists in the declaration or by statute, the power may
nevertheless be implied. 
25
1. The Quasi-Contract Rationale
Implying a right of community associations to levy assessments on their
members serves two key public policy purposes. First, the maintenance of
common property affects the property values and personal wealth of the
CIC members. 126  Second, the maintenance of common property also
affects surrounding municipalities, which do not want the burden of
maintaining such property. 27  For these reasons, courts have readily
granted community associations the power to assess their members in order
to provide, fund, and maintain common infrastructure. Courts typically
imply such power based on a quasi-contract rationale. For example, in
Perry v. Bridgetown Community Ass'n, Inc.,28 the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that "in a community association, the members enjoy the
benefits of the development; the landowners thereby imply consent to the
assessment for reasonable maintenance common to all other members."'
129
Courts have found that property owners impliedly consented to pay
assessments for common infrastructure even if their properties were not
included on the CIC's subdivision maps or when express covenants
obligating them to pay had expired. In Patchogue Properties, Inc. v.
Saccio,130 defendants' property did not appear on the CIC's subdivision
maps.' 31  The defendants' only means of ingress and egress to their
property, however, was on the community's private road, marked by signs,
and manned by a security guard.' 32 The court held that the defendants "had
knowledge or notice at the time of purchase of the private nature of the
community, and are therefore liable for their pro rata share of the
assessments on a theory of implied contract."' 133 In Miles v. Carolina
Forest Ass n, 134 a North Carolina Court of Appeals held that property
123 THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.5 cmt. B (2000).
126 See id.
127 See id.
12' 486 So. 2d 1230 (Miss. 1986).
129 Id. at 1234 (citation omitted).
130 712 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
131 See id. at 739.
132 id.
133 Id.
'3 604 S.E.2d 327 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
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owners impliedly consented to pay assessments for the maintenance of
roads, common areas, and recreational facilities,' 35 even though the express
covenant governing such assessments had expired. 36  The court
determined that their obligation arose through an implied-in-fact
contract. 137
Finally, citing Colorado's version of the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act and The Restatement, the Colorado Supreme Court in
Evergreen Highlands Ass'n v. West, 138 held that a CIC has the implied
power to, among other things, levy assessments in order to fund the
maintenance of common areas. 139 In this case, West had bought property
in the Evergreen Highlands subdivision because payment of assessments
was voluntary, as there was no covenant mandating assessments.' 40 While
the majority of the members of the association later voted to "modify" the
covenants, which effectively created new covenants that made assessments
mandatory, West did not, and he refused to pay assessments after the new
covenants took effect."al The court held that the "modification" of the
covenants to create a new covenant was valid and binding. 142 Furthermore,
it held that the obligation to pay for the maintenance of common areas was
implied, even if West's deed contained no such provision. 43 In short,
courts' use of the quasi-contract theory ensures that those homeowners
benefiting from a community association's provision and maintenance of
common infrastructure are obligated to pay for their share, regardless of
the language of their deeds.
2. The Mini-Government Analogy
Another rationale for implying the power of assessment to community
associations is emerging. Commentators have now begun to liken the
community association to miniature governments. The community
association, like a government, requires the ability to tax its residents in the
form of assessments in order to provide for and maintain common
infrastructure:
' Id. at 330.
136 Id. at 330-31.
'3' Id. at 333-34.
13' 73 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2003).
139 Id. at 7.
140 Id. at 3.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 7.
143 Id.
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The other essential role directly relates to the association's
regulatory powers; and upon analysis of the association's
functions, one clearly sees the association as a quasi-
government entity paralleling in almost every case the
powers, duties, and responsibilities of a municipal
government. As a 'mini-government,' the association
provides to its members, in almost every case, utility
services, road maintenance, street and common area
lighting, and refuse removal. In many cases, it also
provides security services and various forms of
communication within the community. There is, moreover,
a clear analogy to the municipal police and public safety
functions. All of these functions are financed through
assessments or taxes levied upon the members of the
community, with powers vested in the board of directors,
council of co-owners, board of managers, or other similar
body clearly analogous to the governing body of a
municipality.' 4
Pennsylvania courts in particular have relied upon this analogy to
further justify the community association's implied right to levy
assessments. For example, in Holiday Pocono Civic Ass 'n., Inc. v.
Benick, 145 the court stated:
Privately developed residential communities such as
Holiday Poconos are in many respects analogous to mini-
governments and are totally dependent upon collection of
such assessments in order to maintain and clear roads and
provide other essential facilities and services, as well as
recreational amenities which benefit all property owners in
the development. 1
46
The court then explained the public policy supporting the community
association's implied power to assess: holding private communities
144 Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and
Administration of Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 918
(1976) (citations omitted).
14' 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 378 (Pa. C. P. Ct. 1978).
146 Id. at 385.
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themselves - not municipal governments - responsible for their
infrastructure needs:
Without assessments, property owners' associations would
be powerless to operate. The unmaintained roads and
recreational facilities would undoubtedly fall into disrepair
and then be abandoned by associations. Property owners
would ultimately be looking to already overburdened
township and county governments for the rehabilitation
and take-over of the roads and recreational facilities.
47
Citing Holiday Poconos, a Pennsylvania Superior Court in Meadow
Run and Mountain Lake Park Ass'n v. Berkel148 held that a community
association was analogous to a mini-government. 49  In this case, lot
owners had purchased their properties when there was no covenant on
assessments, but they were subject to a covenant that stated that in the
event that a community association was formed, they would be bound by
the rules and regulations promulgated by it.150 A community association
was subsequently formed, and it assessed these lot-owners an annual fee
for maintenance of community lakes, dams, and roads.' 51 The court
legitimized the association's implied power to levy these assessments on
the theory that the association was a mini-government, and "as such [is]
dependent on the collection of assessments to maintain and provide
essential and recreational facilities."'
' 52
Similarly, Spinnler Point Colony Ass 'n., Inc. v. Nash153 cited Meadow
Run's "mini-government" language to hold that a lot-owner whose deed
makes no mention of a community association is still liable to pay
assessments for the maintenance of common areas. 54 The court in Hess v.
Barton Glen Club, Inc. 55 also cited Meadow Run's "mini-government"
language. 56 It held that the community association had the implied power
to levy proportionate assessments for the maintenance of all common
147 Id. at 385-86.
148 598 A.2d 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
149 Id. at 1026.
15o Id.
15' Id. at 1025.
... Id. at 1026 (citing Holiday Pocono Civic Ass'n v. Benick, 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 378 (1978)).
153 689 A.2d 1026, 1028 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
54 Id. at 1028-29.
"'5 718 A.2d 908 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1998).
116 See id. at 912.
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areas, even though the lot-owners' covenants mention a $30 annual fee to
maintain only the lake and park, and even though one lot-owner's deed
made mention of neither the community association nor the $30 fee. 157 In
short, the mini-government analogy serves just as effectively as the quasi-
contract rationale in holding lot-owners responsible for paying their share
for the maintenance of common areas in the community, regardless of
whether their deeds impose such an obligation.
3. Potential Pitfalls of Using Private Assessments in CIC's: Double
Taxation
It is well settled that the community association has the power, whether
expressly or impliedly, based on a theory of quasi-contract or on the
analogy to mini-governments, to assess its members for infrastructure.
Some commentators argue that it is unfair for municipalities to further tax
CIC residents for common property or services that are within the
community.15 8  Specifically, the argument against taxing common areas
and services in addition to individual property within the CIC proceeds as
follows:
The general contention is that common property is so
burdened with covenants that it has no fair market value
and therefore it should not be subject to property tax. This
argument is reinforced with the valid contention that the
individual property owners' units, lots, or homes are
assessed at a higher value than normal because of the
availability of the common property. Assessing both the
unit and the common property constitutes double taxation
because the tax assessor includes the value of common
property in the value of all the individually owned
property.
59
Some courts have responded favorably to this theory. In Saw Creek
Estates Community Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Pike,160 a Pennsylvania court
held that by Pennsylvania statute, common areas within a CIC are not
17 See id. at 913.
158 See, e.g., James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community
Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1176 (1998).
159 Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of Community Associations: In
Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 589, 617 (1993) (footnote omitted).
'60 808 A.2d 322 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
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subject to separate county property taxes. 161 In Applebaum v. Town of
Oyster Bay,162 a CIC had previously entered into an agreement with the
town to provide its own garbage services to its residents.' 63  The town
subsequently assessed a special ad valorem tax against the CIC residents
for garbage services. 164 Because the residents were not receiving the
benefit of the services for which they were taxed, the court invalidated the
tax. 165
Other courts have not been as responsive to the theory. In Ex parte
Lake Forest Property Owners Ass', Inc.,66 the Alabama Supreme Court
held that a county tax assessor could levy ad valorem taxes on the common
areas of a CIC.167  The court did not accept the property owners
association's contention that the common areas were so encumbered that
they had no value. 168  The court also did not accept the association's
argument that the value of the common areas is already taken into account
in the value of the individual lots, so that valuation of the common areas
results in double taxation. 69 Also, in Long Cove Home Owners'Ass'n. v.
Beaufort County Tax Equalization Bd.,170 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that common areas retain value, their value is not subsumed in
the value of community residences, and taxing the common areas does not
constitute double taxation.'71
In response to double taxation concerns, New Jersey was the first state
to pass legislation allocating the respective responsibilities of CIC
homeowners and municipalities for the cost of services like garbage
collection, electricity for street lights, and snow removal. 72  This
legislation, the Municipal Services Act ("MSA"),'73 was passed in 1991
and mandates that municipalities provide garbage, electricity, and snow
removal services for CIC homeowners or reimburse them for the cost of
each service that the CIC provides for itself. 74  Several other states,
161 See id. at 326.
162 609 N.E.2d 118 (N.Y. 1992).
163 See id. at 119.
1 See id.
165 See id. at 120.
'6 659 So. 2d 607 (Ala. 1995).
167 See id. at 612.
'" See id. at 609.
169 Id.
170 488 S.E.2d 857 (S.C. 1997).
171 See id. at 862.
172 See Benjamin D. Lambert, Jr., Municipal Services Equalization: Pot of Gold or Pandora s
Box?, 1I-APR PROB. & PROP. 58, 1997.
173 N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:67-23.2 to -23.8(2005).
174 See id. § 23.3.
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including Maryland, Missouri, and Texas, also allow tax adjustments for
CIC residents already paying assessments for CIC services.
1 75
V. CONCLUSION
That government is unable to foot the bill for much of the public
facilities needs generated by private development is pretty much a given.
The three most prevalent and successful methods of funding such facilities
privately are simple privatization; land development exactions,
dedications, and fees; and assessments on member homeowners in CICs.
Each solution, however, is not a panacea.
The first, simple privatization, pits substantial cost savings to
government against traditional civil service protection. Simple
privatization is attractive to cash-strapped governments interested in
contracting out for innovative, efficient, and cost-effective public service
providers. However, simple privatization often results in the loss of civil
service jobs and hastens the potential return of the spoils system. Simple
privatization is difficult to reconcile with government's traditional role as
provider of essential services for its people. As difficult as the decision to
privatize should be, there is a growing trend toward liberal judicial review
of state plans for simple privatization. Courts support privatization efforts
upon a showing that it is impracticable for civil servants to provide
necessary public services, upon a showing that the service provided is a
"new state function," or upon a showing that the government undertook
privatization in good faith. Simple privatization efforts are likely to
increase in the future.
The second solution, land development exactions, dedications, and fees,
presents constitutional problems associated with regulatory takings when
government attempts to exact a greater toll from private development than
a particular land development project can be expected to generate. Such
developments are responsible for a fair share of the needs generated across
the spectrum of public facilities such as streets, roads, water, sewer,
schools, and sanitary landfills. However, there is a temptation for
government to attempt to redress past deficiencies, and this it may not do,
lest the exaction or fee be labeled a tax, and thus require enabling
legislation, which is seldom met with local support. However, as
demonstrated by studies of exactions and fees, it is not unusual for a new
175 See Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the "Secession of the Successful":
Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675, 1677 (2001).
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single-family residence to be contributing as much as $30,000 toward
public facilities as a condition for development.
The last solution, CIC assessments on private infrastructure, is also a
successful technique for shifting the financial burden to new and existing
homeowners by means of privatization of infrastructure. Such common
infrastructure is used and useable only by members of the association in
the CIC. Of course, government is then relieved of the need to provide
facilities to this segment of its citizenry. Courts increasingly uphold such
assessments, whether or not specifically provided for in the applicable
conditions, covenants, and restrictions filed as part of the CIC
development, on a variety of grounds as discussed above in section III.E.
This privatization technique therefore represents a viable alternative to
government funding of such facilities, but arguably at the social price of
exclusivity. Several commentators have noted at length the various
repercussions.1'6 Moreover, there is a growing reluctance among members
of such communities to be "double taxed" for both public and private
facilities such as parks. In response to such concerns, some jurisdictions
such as Hawaii and New Jersey provide a measure of statutory relief.
Whether this is a fundamentally fair solution is debatable.
In deciding how best to provide infrastructure and services for their
citizens, local governments should weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of the aforementioned options available to them. When
opting for pure privatization, local governments should guard against
selling out the civil service merit system to the lowest bidder. When
conditioning land development, local governments must not force private
developers and homeowners alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the community as a whole.
Finally, in encouraging the development of CICs, because they provide
their own infrastructure and services, local governments should be mindful
of the social consequences flowing literally and figuratively from the
walking off of vital parts of a community. At stake with all of these forms
of privatization are fundamental community values that should not lightly
be bargained away.
176 See, e.g., EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997); David L. Callies, Paul A. Frankese & Heidi Kai Guth,
Gated Communities, Covenants and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177 (2003).
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